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DECENTRALIZATION DILEMMA:
MEASURING THE DEGREE AND EVALUATING THE OUTCOMES.
.
                                             Chanchal Kumar Sharma
Though decentralization  for past  one and half  decade  or so has become the most  favoured policy
priority among the policy makers yet the countries around the world differ dramatically in the degree
of decentralization that  is  accommodated.  While diversity in  degree of decentralization  across  the
world is  a fact  yet there is  no consensus  in  the empirical  literature over the questions  like ‘which
country is more decentralized?’ This is because decentralization is defined and measured differently in
different studies. In fact, a true assessment of the degree of decentralization in a country can be made
only if  a  comprehensive approach  is  adopted  and  rather  than  trying  to  simplify  the  syndrome of
characteristics  into  the  single  dimension  of  autonomy,  interrelationships  of various  dimensions  of
decentralization  are  taken  into  account.  Thus  it  is  to  be  realized  that  there  is  no  simple  one
dimensional,  quantifiable index of degree of decentralization  in  a given country.  As there is  wide
diversity in the studies on degree of decentralization so is the case with the literature on outcomes of it.
Outcome varies  not  only because  decentralization  can  appear  in  various  forms and  combinations
across countries  but  also because different  instruments  may have very different  effects in  different
circumstances.  Thus  arriving  at  the  precise  definition  of  decentralization  and  associating  it  with
particular outcomes is neither possible nor desirable for the simple reason that generalization of any
kind can create pitfalls that can obscure rather than clarify the facts. What is more important is the
need for a strictly contextual yet comprehensive approach while going beyond the blunt measures like
expenditure decentralization  and  taking politics  and  institutional  arrangements  of the specific  case
under investigation also into account.  
Introduction: 
The question of degree and design of decentralization has gained much significance as there
is an increasing trend toward more and more decentralization across the world. Both federal
and  unitary  countries,  whether  industrialized  or  developing  are  moving  toward  more
decentralization.  Though decentralization has become the  most  favoured  policy priority
among the policy makers  yet  the countries  around the  world differ  dramatically in  the
degree and extent of decentralization that is allowed and accommodated. Thus the question
arises, how to measure decentralization so that the difference in degree of decentralization
may  be  quantified.  But  it  is  seen  that  different  studies  come  to  different  conclusions
regarding comparative estimate of the degree of decentralization in different countries. 
Section I looks into this question of measurement of the degree of decentralization. It is
understandable that there is ‘diversity’ in degree of decentralization across the world but the
concern here is that there is ‘disparity’ in its measurement. In fact, how decentralization is
measured depends partly on how it is defined. It is argued that there is no consensus on
precise definition of decentralization which increases the possibility of the use of competing
measures of decentralization. 
The literature reviewed in section II reveals that not all scholars agree that decentralization
invariably  produces  desirable  or  intended  outcomes.  It  is  argued  that  the  impact  of
decentralization depends on specifics of the case and one has to look into the whole range
of factors that affect the behaviour of the people who are involved in public policy making
and service provision. The concluding section summarizes the central arguments.
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I
Isabelle Joumard and Per Mathis Kongsrud (2003) have shown in their study that degree of
decentralization  (as  measured  by  the  share  of  sub  national  governments  in  general
government spending and revenue) varies significantly across OECD countries. They have
also shown that degree of decentralization is not always encouraged by a federal structure
and not always restrained by unitary institutional structure. In their study  they found that
some unitary countries (Denmark and Sweden) were more decentralized than the countries
identified as federal (Germany, Mexico and United states). In this working paper of OECD
Economics  department,  it  has  been  shown that  the  degree  of  decentralization does  not
correspond  directly  with  the  fact-  whether  a  country  is  recognized  as  federal  or  not.
Differences in the degree of decentralization as  given in  Government Finance Statistics
Year Book 1998, IMF are shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Differences in Degree of Decentralization               
(a)  Sub national Share of
Expenditures      
A. Sub Saharan Africa (4) 
B. East Asia and the Pacific (4)
C. Latin America and the
Caribbean 
D. Europe and Central Asia (13)
E. High Income, OECD (18)
F. South Asia (1)
(b) Sub national Share of
Revenues      
A.  Sub-Saharan Africa (5)
B. East Asia and th Pacific (7)
C. Latin America and 
       the Caribbean (13)
D. Europe and Central Asia (15)
E. High Income, OECD (21)
F. South Asia (1) 
G. Middle East and Northern
Africa (1)
Note:  Simple  average  of  most  recent  observations  in  available  countries.  Numbers  in
parenthesis indicate number of countries represented.
Source: International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics Year Book 1998, Country
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Though diversity in  degree of  decentralization across  the world is  a  fact  yet  when
decentralization literature is looked more closely it comes to light that there is no consensus
on  definition  and  measurement  of  decentralization.  “Simplifying  the  syndrome  of
characteristics into the single dimension of autonomy becomes more complicated when we
consider  other  aspects  of  decentralization  at  the  same time.  For  example,  the  level  of
autonomy becomes unclear when we compare a local government with significant resources
(fiscal  decentralization)  and  deconcentrated  authority (administrative  centralization)  to  a
local  authority  with  few  resources  (fiscal  centralization)  but  devolved  authority
(administrative decentralization).  Correct  measurement of  autonomy requires  taking into
account the interrelationship of the dimensions” (Schneider 2003).
Reliability and usefulness of the favoured indicators of decentralization as composite
measures  of  decentralized  authority  come  into  question  when  findings  of  two  studies
regarding extent of decentralization in a particular country contradict each other or results
challenge the very commonsense, for instance, in an OECD study quoted above, Denmark,
where  central  government  tightly  regulates  virtually  every  aspect  of  local  government
finance  is  shown  as  more  decentralized  than  United  States.  Figures  sometimes  are
misleading. For instance, consider the given table: 
Table 1: Tax Allocations among Levels of Government
(Percentage of Total Tax Collected)
    
 
                                  *Local tax revenues are included in the state totals. 
                              Source: James Edwin Kee (2003).
 J.E. Key explains, “It is somewhat surprising that the U.S. appears more centralized
than any of  the  other  federal  nations  studied.  This  first  glance,  however,  is  somewhat
deceptive. State and local tax revenue in the U.S. is all “own-source” revenue; that is, state
and local governments rely on their own taxing powers to raise their tax revenue. For the
other countries, a substantial percentage of the regional/state share of taxes is the result of 
Country Federal Region/S
tate
Local
Brazil 45.6 47.4 7.0
China 52..1 47.9*
     Germany 50.2 37.4 12.4
India 46.6 53.4*
Japan 60.0 40.0*
Korea 79.0 21.0*
Russia 46.3 53.7*
United
States
59.5 25.3 15.2
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constitutional or legislative decisions to allow regional governments to  share  national tax
revenues”. 
One  can  draw  on  this  observation  to  imply  that  it  is  in  fact  the  basic  structure  of
intergovernmental  fiscal  relations  and  more  specifically  how  sub  national  levels  are
financed (revenue sharing or independent local taxation  1) that is the real measure of the
quality of decentralization. It is generally upheld that subnational governments can be said
to be fiscal sovereigns only if they depend on independent subnational taxation. Omar Azfar
and others (1999) in contrast give less importance to the devolution of tax power. In view of
the authors, “The most sensible form of decentralization primarily devolve expenditures
rather than taxes (using transparent and formula driven fiscal transfers) because devolution
of power to tax can  create vertical externalities in terms of tax rates that are too high.”
Burki et.al (1999) also argue that in area of revenues, whether states raise most of their own
revenue is less important than whether transfers to states are non-discretionary. 
In fact on the basis of ‘decentralization instrument’ there are two strands in the literature
that  argue  for  two  different  approaches  to  measure  fiscal  autonomy.  One  gives  more
weightage to devolution of tax authority as an instrument of decentralization and hold it
crucial  for  subnational  autonomy,  the  other  gives  more  weight  to  the  nature  of
intergovernmental  transfers  (discretionary  or  not)  as  an  instrument  impacting  upon  the
subnational behaviour and effecting their autonomy and accountability. 
Thus former choose to focus on fiscal policy i.e., the relationship between expenditures and
allocated revenues (vertical imbalance) while latter pay attention to regulatory or financial
mechanisms i.e. the nature of intergovernmental transfers (for instance Nice 1987, Ahmad
1997).  Out  of  these  two  approaches,  it  can  be  observed,  that  when  it  comes  to  the
measurement of fiscal decentralization ‘the share of subnational expenditures and revenues’
is considered the best indicator.  This is because fiscal instruments are easier to measure
while regulatory and financial instruments are extremely complex and difficult to measure
statistically because nowhere transfers remain strictly confined to the technical objectives.
Transfers pursue a mix of objectives and politically motivated transfers remain key part of
the intergovernmental relations across the globe and moreover, as Rojas (1998) argue that
the  attempts  to  eliminate  them have simply demonstrated  their  resilience.  According to
Auron Schneider  (2003),  “Revenues and expenditures  offer  the best  measures available
without  detailed  study  of  each  and  every  country.  Second,  errors  are  not  likely  to  be
correlated with other variables of interest thus they introduce no bias into estimation”. The
choice  of  focusing  on  fiscal  instruments  however  is  not  just  methodological  but  also
substantial  because  “by  using  both  expenditures  and  revenues,  we  tap  into  the  main
attributes implied by the concept of fiscal decentralization” (Schneider, 2003, p21). It must
however  be  added  that  measurement  of  fiscal  instruments  is  not  free  from limitations.
Reliability and  validity of the best  data  source  for  the purpose i.e.  IMF’s  Government
Finance Statistics (GFS) is not entirely incontestable.  For instance Byskov (2001) points
out, “While various expenditure patterns can be assessed by the GFS data, less can be said
about expenditure autonomy.  Expenditures that are mandated by the central government
appear  as sub-national expenditures,  even though subnational governments may have no
autonomy in these spending decisions…… Shared taxes appear as sub-national revenue,
although the sub-national government has no autonomy in determining the revenue base or
rate…..Vertical imbalance -- measured by intergovernmental transfers as a share of sub-
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national expenditures, does not distinguish what proportion of transfers is conditional versus
general purpose. GFS data do not provide this information”.
 Burki  et.al  (1999)  use  the  classical  definition  of  decentralization   according to  which
decentralization may be defined as “ the extent to which power is  held by autonomous
elected subnational government capable of taking binding decisions in at least some policy
areas”. On basis of this definition the authors identify four variables to measure the extent of
decentralization which they use to rank eight Latin American countries according to their
degree  of  decentralization.  The  four  variables  are  :  (a)  Electoral  Autonomy  (b)
Independence of subnational party organization (c) Subnational share of total spending and
(d) Functional responsibilities in major sectors.
Thus, there is a reason to believe that in different studies decentralization is defined and
measured differently and this difference may account for wide divergence in the empirical
literature over the questions like which country is more decentralized (two studies using
different indicators and methods of measurement arrive at different results).  Yilmaz and
Ebel  (2002)  while  discussing  competing  measures  of  decentralization  in  a  single  case
observe that decentralization is surprisingly difficult to measure and possibility of use of
competing  measures  of  fiscal  decentralization  makes  the  estimation  results  extremely
fragile. They study the fragility of estimation results depending on how one measures fiscal
decentralization (and, therefore, the danger in drawing sweeping conclusions) that often has
important policy implications.
 In  fact  decentralization  is  not  easy  to  define  as  it  encompasses  a  wide  variety  of
institutional arrangements and institutional reforms. “Decentralization seems often to mean
whatever  the  person  using  the  term  wants  it  to  mean”  (Bird,  1993;  p208).   Ostrom,
Schroeder  and  Wynne  (1993,  p23)  also  emphasize  that  a  precise  meaning  for
decentralization does not exist. Though one can observe that different authors working on
decentralization are in fact talking about a broadly similar idea, but they use different labels
in quite different ways which do result in different interpretations of the conclusions drawn
from  the  empirical  studies.  According  to  Richard  Crook  and  James  Manor  (2000)
decentralization is a general term for “transfer of powers and resources from higher to lower
levels in a political system” Decentralization according to the authors, can take three forms.
“These  forms  can  stand  alone  or  work  together:  •  Deconcentration,  or  administrative
decentralization, occurs when agents in higher levels of government move to lower levels. •
Fiscal  decentralization  occurs  when  higher  levels  of  government  cede  influence  over
budgets  and  financial  decisions  to  lower  levels.  •  Devolution,  or  democratic
decentralization, occurs when resources, power, and often tasks are shifted to lower-level
authorities  who are  somewhat  independent  of  higher  authorities,  and  who  are  at  least
somewhat democratic” (p, 1). Thus according to the authors decentralization is an umbrella
term  for  all  different  methods  of  decentralization  used  for  different  purposes.  Peter
Whiteford (2001) however, considers devolution as an umbrella term that “covers all forms 
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of transfers of responsibility” (p112). In fact there is a vast literature on different meanings
and types of decentralization. To quote the most significant ones; Theorists like Rondinelli
and Nellis, (1986) have identified four popular typologies of decentralization: devolution,
delegation,  deconcentration,  and  divestment  (or  privatization).   Deconcentration2 occurs
when the central government disperses responsibilities for certain services to its regional
branch  offices.  This  does  not  involve  any  transfer  of  authority  to  lower  levels  of
government and is unlikely to lead to the potential benefits or pitfalls of decentralization.
Delegation3  refers to the situation in which the central government transfers responsibility
for decision making and administration of public functions to local governments or semi-
autonomous  organizations  (local  governments  are  not  wholly  controlled  by  the  central
governments but are ultimately accountable to it). Finally, devolution, refers to a situation in
which  the  central  government  transfers  authority  for  decision-making,  finance,  and
management to quasi-autonomous units of local government. Divestment is the transfer of
public services and institutions to private companies and firms. Cohen and Peterson (1999)
identify  six  major  approaches  to  classify  decentralization4.  First  is  Historical  approach
(Types: French, English, Soviet and Traditional decentralization). Second is Hierarchy and
Function approach of Berkely Decentralization project (Types: Territorial and Functional
decentralization).  Third  is  Problem  and  Value  centered  approach  (Types:  Devolution,
Functional  devolution,  Interest  organization,  prefectoral  deconcentration,  ministerial
deconcentration,  delegation  to  autonomous  agencies,  philanthrophy  and  Marketization).
Fourth is Service delivery approach presented by United nations in 1962 (Types: Local level
government  systems,  Partnership  systems,  Dual  systems  and  Integrated  administrative
systems).  Fifth  is  Objective  Based  Approach  (Types:  Administrative  (deconcentration,
devolution & delegation) Political,  Spatial,  Market decentralization) and Finally there is
Single country experience approach. Similarly, Deniel Tiersman, (2000), defines five types
of political decentralization (namely structural decentralization, decision decentralization,
resource decentralization, electoral decentralization and institutional decentralization) and
outlines  five  arguments  about  how specific  types  may affect  governance.  He  basis  his
arguments on statistical tests, using newly collected data on up to 154 countries. He argues
that it is quite possible that some types of decentralization improve governance while others
impair it. It is in the similar sense that Weingast (2000) has argued that there is a possibility
that some federal systems foster growth, while others are likely to hinder it. 
Thus it is clear that decentralization is a multifaceted complex issue. It has many shades
depending on how different kinds of decentralizations mix with each other in a particular
context. Thus no one type could be studied in isolation. For instance, fiscal decentralization
cannot be analyzed without taking into account as to which particular shade or variant of it
we  are  attempting  to  investigate  depending  on  how  it  mixes  with  other  kinds  of
decentralizations such as political, administrative and market decentralization in a particular
historical-cultural-institutional  context.  Therefore  a  true  assessment  of  the  degree  of
decentralization in a country can be made only if a comprehensive approach to measure
decentralization is adopted as “….there is no simple one dimensional, quantifiable index of
degree of decentralization in a given country” (UNCDF, 1999, p167).
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II.
As there is wide diversity in the studies on degree of decentralization so is the case with the
literature on outcomes of  it.  It  is  shown that  the positive gains that  are  conventionally
attached to decentralization (efficiency, transparency, accountability) are not always directly
proportional to the degree of it (i.e., with more decentralization more benefits do not always
come).  Rather  sometimes  negative  outcomes  are  associated  with  decentralization.  It  is
generally argued that decentralization of government in terms of  devolution, can improve
governance by fostering  accountability,  participation, and  transparency But devolution in
itself  does  not  guarantee  better  governance.  Indeed,  ineffective  or  improper  devolution
creates more problems than it solves. Therefore, it is vital that decentralization efforts be
carefully crafted keeping in view that problems entrenched in the system by virtue of the
existence of legacies of centralization which could distort  the intended outcomes of the
decentralization  process.  Legacies  of  centralization  (such  as  paternalism,  clientelism,
institutional  rigidity,  asymmetry  in  information  and  supply  driven  interventions)  often
persist to impede the realization of core objectives of decentralization and thus are required
to be addressed first in order to ensure effective local institutions. 
Besides  the  legacies  of  centralization,  there  are  some  other  circumstances  in  which
decentralization not only fails to bring about the desired outcome but can actually reduce
the quality of governance. For instance, in a very small state, decentralization and creation
of autonomous local entities can lead to loss of economies of scale and can bring about
macroeconomic instability. Additionally, fiscal decentralization can drain central revenues
when the national government is unable regulate public spending. Local governments may
also lack the capacity and the expertise  found in  national  institutions.  These challenges
reinforce the importance of effective planning and design in undertaking decentralization.
In literature it can be seen that there are studies establishing both negative and positive
correlation with traditionally assumed positive impacts of decentralization.  For instance,
Zhang and Zou (1998) reported negative effect of decentralization on provincial growth in
China. Jin et al. (1999) showed that this relationship is positive once one filters out cyclical
effects. Lin and Liu (2000) confirmed this result. Akai and Sakata (2002) reported positive
effect of decentralization on growth of US states in early 1990s. Xie et al. (1999) showed no
long-term relationship between these variables in the US for 50 years. Woller and Phillips
(1998)  found  no  link  between decentralization  and  growth  in  developing  countries.  In
contrast, Davoodi and Zou (1998) reported negative, marginally significant, relationship in
developing countries and no effect in developed countries.  Robalino et al.  (2001) found
negative  cross-country  relationship  between  decentralization  and  infant  mortality.
Zhuravskaya (2000) reported positive effect of marginal decentralization on healthcare and
education outcomes in Russian municipalities.  
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Main  arguments  of  the  scholarly  works  that  associate  positive  outcomes  with
decentralization are: 
1. It potentially improves macroeconomic management (Shah, 1997)
2. Decentralization  leads  to  good  governance  (Hayek 1939,  Tiebout  1956,  Rubinfeld
1987 and Mc Kinnon and Nechyba 1997).
3. It limits the size of the public sector (Marlow,1988; Grossman,1989; Ehdaie, 1994)
4. It  has  a  negative  effect  on corruption  (  Fisman and Gatti  2002  and  de  Mello  and
Barenstein 2001)  
5. Local Governments under constituent pressure are managing resources and delivering
services effectively (Putnam, 1993)
6. Public scrutiny forces elected officials  to appoint competent staff (Fiszbein, 1997)
7. Fiscal  decentralization  enhances  political  autonomy  which  in  return  motivates
participation at local Level (Inter-American Development Bank, 1997)
8. Decentralized systems are responsive to citizens’ preferences (Huther and Shah, 1998)
9. Decentralization  strengthens  accountability  because  it  increases  proximity  between
representatives and electorate. (Seabright 1995 and Bardhan and Mukherjee,1998  )
Similarly many scholarly works assert that there could be certain dangers  inherent in the
process of decentralization. Their main arguments are: 
1. It is Inherently destabilizing (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996)
2. Spillovers, common pool problems and problems from soft budget constraints result in
efficiency  losses  associated  with  decentralization  (  Inman  and  Rubinfeld  1997,
Sanguinetti 1994,   Rodden 2000, Stein 1998, Wildasin 1997 and Willis, Garman and
Haggard 1998).   
3. It is  Associated with slower growth (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Xie, Zou and Davoodi,
1999)
4. Local Governments are more corrupt &  decentralization leads to greater state capture (
Goldsmith, 1999, Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000).
5. It  has  been  argued  that  there  is  no  significant  relationship  between  fiscal
decentralization and public sector size (Oates, 1985; Nelson, 1986). Thus the assertion
that it limits the size of public sector is not true.
Not withstanding the confusion that above literature create, its main contribution is that it
tears apart the myth of decentralization as a universal remedy for ills of governance and 
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shows that it does have potential disadvantages (under certain conditions) and a clear cut
value judgment of decentralization per se can not possibly be made.
Thus  it  is  clear  that  attempts  to  evaluate  the  impacts  of  decentralization  have  largely
remained inconclusive. Though all the above works have evidence on their side in support
of their respective arguments yet it is to be realized that most of them use the Government
Finance Statistics  (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund to measure decentralization
which ‘unfortunately, do not include information on the level of autonomy of subnational
governments in terms of their revenues or expenditures, which is ‘important information
when analyzing decentralization’ (Meloche et al, 2004,  Yilmaz and Ebel, 2002, Byskov,
2001).
Despite  above  observation,  in  continuation  with  the  concern  regarding  definition  and
measurement of decentralization (as noted in previous section) it is not to be assumed that
whatever diversity and inconclusiveness exists is not only because of lack of agreement on
accurate  measure  of  decentralization and  the  resultant  differences  in data  selection  and
interpretation. It is also because of overlooking and disregarding many other crucial 
‘mediating factors.’ Therefore the question is not much of accuracy but more importantly of
adequacy of decentralization indicator(s) in specific context.
Thus the literature survey is also tip off for investigating those factors that mediate with
decentralization process to bring about different outcomes. By now the predominant 
argument is  that  the outcome of  fiscal  decentralization  varies  because it  can  appear  in
various  forms and  combinations  (as  noted  in  previous  section)  across  countries,  within
countries and even within sectors making the assessment of its degree itself an arduous task 
in the first place.  But taking a step further, it can be argued that even if one assumes two
hypothetical cases of exactly similar design of decentralization, the outcome can still be
expected to differ because “different instruments may have very different effects in different
circumstances” ( Litvek et al, 1999).  This is because legal and constitutional framework, as
well as institutional structure of the public  administration system in each country has a
bearing  on  the  outcome  of  fiscal  decentralization  application.  In  fact  successful
implementation is generally recognized as a function of the existing institutions (whether
they  provide  political  and  economic  incentives  to  the  local  public  officials  for  better
governance and better implementation of fiscal decentralization or not). Such institutions
however  can  not  be  imported  and  must  be  built  domestically.  The  outcome  of  fiscal
decentralization reforms is also inextricably tied to the question of "sorting-out" (Tiebout,
1956 and Breton and Scott, 1978) public sector responsibilities among different levels of
government. Since there  is  no prescribed set  of rules for  "sorting-out" that apply to all
countries, the specific aspects of fiscal decentralization process can be worked out in the
context of each individual country. In addition to this, the issue of designing an effective
intergovernmental  structure  also  involves  electing  local  government  officials,  having
approved budget locally, keeping adequate books of account and monitoring, and  finally in
words of  Ronald  Watts  (2002 p.8)  putting  in  place  a  better  system of  procedures  and
institutions designed to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration (i.e., between the national,
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regional and local centers of decision making) in cases of shared domains or  inevitable
overlapping of responsibilities.
Thus, outcome of fiscal decentralization in a federal or unitary country will depend on what
kind or variant (s) of it is pursued with what objectives, under what political conditions,
legal  and  constitutional  structure,  political  processes,  features  of  political  institutions,
political decision structures and public administration system and political and economic
incentive  structures.  Balanchard  and  Shleifer  (2000)  have  shown  in  their  study  that
decentralization will bring advantages conventionally attached to it  if  there is   a strong
center  but  in  case  of  a  weak  center  the  country will  be  confronted  with  all  potential
problems  identified  with  decentralization.  Empirical  studies  on  outcome  of  fiscal
decentralization in Brazil, for instance study by Dillinger and Webb (1999) concludes that
greater  fiscal  decentralization  in  Brazil  has  resulted  in  budgetary  and  financial  crisis.
Academic  literature  on  Brazil  has  delineated  reasons  for  this  by  asserting  that  Brazil's
democratic  political  institutions--including  electoral  rules,  the  political  party  system,
federalism, and the rules of legislative procedure--are sub-optimal from the viewpoints of
democratic  representativeness and policymaking effectiveness.  All these sub optimalities
contribute to centrifugal power and multiple veto points, which in turn imply institutional
ineffectiveness and ungovernability (Mainwaring 1999, Ames 2001, Shugart, and Carey 
1992). In this context it is important to mention what Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003)
have tried to show. They have argued that the effect of decentralization strongly depend on
two aspects of political centralization: (a) Strength of national party system (measured by
fractionalization of parliament and age of main parties) and (b) subordination (whether local
and state executives are appointed or elected). The authors have supported Riker’s 
theory (1964)  in  developing countries,  that  the  strong parties  significantly improve  the
results of fiscal decentralization in terms of economic growth, quality of government and
public  goods  provision.  The  authors  assert  that  subordination  of  local  to  higher-level
governments improves the effect  of  decentralization on  growth (in  both developed  and
developing countries) and government quality (in developing countries).
Conclusion:
The  literature  reviewed  above  in  context  of  the  degree,  design  and  outcomes  of
decentralization shows that decentralization has been approached by a variety of intellectual
traditions with little agreement. To quote Auron Schneider (2003) “The differences in kind
and  degree  of  decentralization  have  produced  a  conceptual  muddle.  The  muddle  has
multiplied  the  conceptualizations  of  decentralization,  imbued  it  with  positive  normative
value, conflated it with other concepts and ignored its multi-dimensionality. There has also
been an explosion of units of analysis in studying this concept” (p6). 
A World Bank report [Burki  ,Guillermo and Dillinger  (1999) ] finds that  the impact of
decentralization—its  effect  on  the  efficiency  of  public  services,  on  equity  and  on
macroeconomic  stability—depends  very  much  on  the  specifics  of  the  case.  The  core
argument is that one has to look beyond the question of whether a country has elections at
the local level, whether a nominal transfer of functional responsibilities has taken place or
whether intergovernmental transfers have grown to the whole range of factors that affect the
behaviour of the people who are involved in public policymaking and service provision. 
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Thus arriving at the precise definition of decentralization and associating it with particular
outcomes is neither possible nor desirable for the simple reason that generalization of any
kind can create pitfalls that can obscure rather than clarify the facts. What is more important
is the need for a strictly contextual yet comprehensive approach while going beyond the
blunt  measures  like  expenditure  decentralization  and  taking  politics  and  institutional
arrangements of the specific case under investigation also into account.  Analysis of the
impact  of  decentralization  on  macro  indicators  thus  requires qualitative  as  well  as
quantitative techniques that take into account the countries’ institutional structures.   It is to
be realized that if more refined data are difficult to collect (a common excuse) then a more
rounded data is difficult to rely upon. 
NOTES: 
1.  Both  approaches  have  their  comparative  advantages  and  disadvantages.  In
decentralization of tax responsibilities there is a trade off between increased autonomy and
increased  economic  costs,  because  lower  level  taxes  can  introduce  inefficiencies  in
allocation  of  resources  across  the  federation  and  cause  interpersonal  and  interregional
inequities. Collection and compliance costs can also increase significantly. But this does 
not make the case for centralization of taxes and consequent reliance on central transfers
and  revenue  sharing  because  in  that  case  unrestrained  credit  access  by  subnational
governments will pose a risk for macro stabilization policies of the central government as 
such an arrangement increases anticipation of bailout by higher level government in case of
default. In developing countries , general revenue sharing are typically used to deal with
fiscal gap. A number of countries including China, India,  Malaysia,  Pakistan and South
Africa  in  past  have  tried  deficit  grants  to  fill  fiscal  gaps  at  subnational  levels  with
unwelcome results  in terms of mushrooming of subnational  deficits.  Problems posed by
both the approaches can in fact be mitigated by the fiscal arrangements that permit joint
occupation and harmonization of taxes. 
2. While this kind of decentralization is most common in unitary countries where local field
offices (not independent and accountable local governments) are simply used to improve
efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, yet deconcentration can also exist for some
functions in federal countries when the central government maintains a strong interest in
ensuring delivery of a particular service.
3.This form of decentralization can be characterized as a principal-agent relationship, with
central  governments  as  the  principal  and  the  local  government  as  agent.  From  this
perspective the main design issue is to ensure that a self interested agent (local government)
faces incentive that induce it to act as closely as possible in accordance with the wishes of
the principal (central government). Alternatively however, as in traditional economic theory
of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972), both levels of government could be seen as agents of
different group of citizens. So long as local governments are hierarchically subordinated to 
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the central government, both approaches lead to the same conclusion ‘ central government
preferences should dominate and the design problem  remains as such ( Seabright, 1996).
4. Cohen and Peterson (1999) while summarizing different forms of decentralization state
that in the real world, as opposed to the analytical world, it is difficult to fully separate these
different forms of decentralization. The analytical  forms are useful in that they define a
perspective but they are difficult to separate out because each affects the others in subtle
ways that vary greatly from among task environments (pp 18-19).
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